Gabriel Hetland is the author of the book “Democracy on the Ground: Local Politics in Latin America’s Left Turn.”

“What we did in Venezuela, I think, is the perfect, the perfect scenario,” U.S. President Donald Trump told the New York Times in a March 1 interview about his plans for war on Iran. Things have not gone as Trump hoped, to put it mildly. Trump’s search for the Iranian Delcy Rodríguez — a regime insider willing to comply with U.S. demands, as Rodríguez has since she ascended from Venezuela’s vice president to acting president following the January 3 U.S. attack on Venezuela and kidnapping of its president, Nicolás Maduro — hit a snag when the U.S. and Israel killed most of the would-be successors to Ayatollah Khamenei in the opening days of the war. During a March 3 meeting with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Trump told reporters, “Most of the people we had in mind are dead.” (Trump omitted the crucial fact that the U.S. is to blame.)

As the war passes the four-week mark, it is abundantly clear Iran will not be the next Venezuela. Operation Absolute Resolve, the code name for the U.S. attack on Venezuela, was a spectacular success in tactical terms. The U.S. achieved its military aim of removing Maduro in just a few hours and suffered zero U.S. service member fatalities and only a handful of injuries, although the operation cost the lives of around 70 Venezuelans and 32 Cuban security forces. While this toll should not be minimized, it pales in comparison to the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran, which as of mid-March has led to at least 3,000 deaths in Iran, Lebanon, and beyond. In contrast to Trump’s “brilliant operation” in Caracas, the war on Iran has exploded. Well over a dozen countries are now involved, and the war threatens to bring the global economy to a halt due to the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a pivotal passage for oil, liquid natural gas, fertilizer, and other crucial commodities.

As the world’s eyes remain fixed on Iran, it is important to ask: What has the Venezuela model actually achieved in Venezuela? The short answer is a new form of colonialism in which Venezuela has lost its national sovereignty. Trump’s pledge to “run” Venezuela, made in the hours after the January 3 attack, has not come to pass. The attack instead led to regime change without a change of regime, in which the U.S. removed Maduro but left his regime almost entirely intact. Trump has boasted of this fact, telling the New York Times, “Everybody’s kept their job except two people,” i.e., Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, both of whom have spent the past three months awaiting trial in a Brooklyn jail. The officials who now run Venezuela come directly from Maduro’s administration: Rodríguez; her brother Jorge, who heads the National Assembly; and the minister of interior, Diosdado Cabello. In a possible sign of future changes to come, Rodríguez on March 18 replaced Venezuela’s longstanding minister of defense, Vladimir Padrino López, all but surely in coordination with the U.S.

The flip side of this overall continuity is the Trump administration’s stunning and continuing sidelining of far-right opposition leader María Corina Machado, who won the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize and infamously gifted it to Trump in an unsuccessful attempt to curry his favor. Trump has supported Rodríguez because she offers that which he most wants: stability. A handover to Machado threatened to plunge Venezuela into chaos and civil war. Strictly speaking, this is not because Machado “lacks the respect within” Venezuela, as Trump claimed during his January 3 press conference. Polls indicate Machado remains the most popular politician within Venezuela. The problem, for Trump, is Machado’s longstanding opposition to any form of “collaboration” with the Maduro administration and Chavismo (the political movement associated with the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez) more broadly. This radical stance makes Machado a major threat to Venezuela’s military and state apparatus. Machado may be reevaluating her hardline position as she plans to return to Venezuela. In a March 12 press conference, Machado spoke of a “grand national agreement,” presumably a power-sharing accord, a possibility she had long rejected. Trump, for his part, has reportedly told Machado, who fled the country in 2025, not to return to Venezuela. This is purportedly out of concern for her safety but is more likely due to Trump’s (not unreasonable) fear that Machado’s presence in Venezuela would undermine the continuity Trump has sought to preserve.

For now, Venezuela remains in the hands of former Maduro officials, who have presided over a transformation of Venezuela’s domestic and foreign policy that is both stunning and limited. The details of this transformation, and the way it is happening, lay bare Venezuela’s profound lack of national sovereignty. While Trump is not “running” Venezuela in an operational sense, the U.S. is now effectively dictating the country’s policy. This is evident in many ways, starting with the fact that the Rodríguez administration must submit a monthly budget to the U.S., which has the discretion to approve or reject Venezuela’s requests. The Trump administration has also seized at least 80 million barrels of Venezuelan oil and controls the sale of this oil, with the proceeds held not in Caracas but in a U.S. Treasury account (prior to that, they were held in a U.S.-controlled account in Qatar). American Democratic Party leaders have repeatedly questioned this arrangement, which is not only blatantly colonial and opaque but also creates the clear potential for corruption and malfeasance.

Under direct pressure from the Trump administration, Venezuela’s National Assembly has implemented sweeping oil and mining reforms. In late January, the National Assembly passed a major reform of Venezuela’s hydrocarbons law regulating oil production. The reform institutes three fundamental changes: First, it dramatically lowers the taxes and royalties foreign oil companies pay to the Venezuelan state. Under the 2006 hydrocarbons law, the Venezuelan state took up to 65 percent of oil proceeds. The reform permits this to be reduced to 25 percent, lowers income taxes to 15 percent (from 30 percent), and caps royalties at 30 percent, with the executive given discretion to lower it even further. Second, the reform allows foreign oil companies to operate independently, instead of the previous mandate that foreign companies operate through joint projects with Venezuela’s national oil company, PDVSA. Third, the reform allows arbitration over disputes to occur in foreign courts, eliminating the earlier requirement that disputes be resolved within Venezuela. These changes give foreign oil companies dramatically greater material benefits and control over the country’s oil.

Foreign oil companies are already taking advantage. Shell and Chevron are reportedly close to signing major new deals for production in Venezuela. Chevron is the only U.S. oil major that remained in Venezuela throughout the Hugo Chávez and Maduro years, with Shell (like Exxon and others) having left the country in the wake of the 2006–2007 nationalization process under Chávez. Despite these deals, it will take significant time and resources — upward of $100 billion and a decade of work, according to experts — for Venezuela’s oil industry to approach its previous levels of production. These latest deals come in the wake of the second recent visit by a Trump Cabinet member to Venezuela. Energy Secretary Chris Wright toured Venezuela in mid-February, and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum traveled there in early March, when he gushed about Washington’s desire to access Venezuela’s mineral resources. CIA Director John Ratcliffe and U.S. Southern Command General Francis Donovan have also recently traveled to Venezuela. During Burgum’s visit, Rodríguez promised to work at “Trump speed” to ramp up the U.S.’s access to Venezuela’s mineral resources. Rodríguez has been as good as her word, with the National Assembly swiftly moving to approve a new mining law that, like the hydrocarbons reform, will roll back decades-old nationalist legislation.

The U.S. has also pushed Venezuela to sever its relations with its rivals China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba. A statement from Venezuela’s foreign ministry late last month about the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran shows the profound changes underway. The statement (which was later taken down) condemned Iran but failed to condemn or even name the U.S. or Israel. This is a major shift from the Chávez and Maduro years, when Venezuela stood with Iran and regularly condemned the U.S. and Israel. The change in Venezuela’s foreign policy is most clear on Cuba, which for more than a decade relied heavily on highly subsidized Venezuelan oil. After Maduro’s capture, Venezuela ceased all oil shipments to Cuba, directly contributing to the profound energy crisis it is now facing, marked by regular nationwide blackouts. The Trump administration has done everything it can to deepen this crisis by applying heavy pressure on Mexico and other countries to stop providing oil to Cuba. Trump’s open goal is regime change.

While Venezuela’s economic and foreign policy has shifted quickly and decisively, political change since Maduro’s capture has been much more slow going. There is still no timetable for elections, and the Trump administration is not pushing for a democratic transition any time soon. According to a New York Times report, Rubio and Rodríguez have discussed the possibility of holding elections in late 2027, and Rubio has made clear that there must be a new democratically elected government in Venezuela before Trump leaves office in 2029. Rodríguez has taken a few steps toward political liberalization. She has pledged to close the notorious El Helicoide prison, and on February 19 the National Assembly passed an amnesty law, which has been greeted as a positive development but criticized for limiting the time period and offenses covered by the law. According to a March 17 report by the Venezuelan human rights organization Foro Penal, as of February 24 the government had released over 400 political prisoners.

A key question is: How do ordinary Venezuelans feel about the changes happening in their country? One answer comes from the first in-person poll conducted in Venezuela following Maduro’s removal, with 1,000 respondents interviewed between January 24 and 30. The poll indicates Venezuelans largely support the January 3 operation and feel cautiously optimistic about the future but deeply unsatisfied with their economic situation and wary of the Rodríguez administration. Fifty-five percent of respondents approve of Maduro’s removal and 77 percent view him unfavorably. Rodríguez fares a tad better, with 73 percent viewing her unfavorably, while 37 percent approve and 41 percent disapprove of her performance as acting president.

This suggests many Venezuelans are in a wait-and-see holding pattern with Rodríguez. Tellingly, 62 percent of respondents list cost of living as their priority versus just 7 percent prioritizing democracy. The poll also indicates Venezuelans are evenly split in their views of the U.S. government and Trump, with roughly half supportive and half opposed. Of the respondents, 72 percent reported they feel Venezuela is moving in a positive direction and 83 percent feel optimistic about the future.

These findings are in line with recent public comments by Venezuelan scholars and journalists. In a February 3 online Atlantic Council forum, Guillermo Aveledo, a political science professor at Universidad Metropolitana in Caracas, said most Venezuelans were feeling cautiously optimistic but continue to fear government repression. Aveledo also spoke of how citizens and the government will be testing the waters in the coming weeks and months to see what is acceptable in terms of public speech and protest.

During a March 11 interview I conducted with him, Andrés Antillano, a member of the anti-imperialist leftist organization Corriente Comunes and professor at the Universidad Central de Venezuela, expressed a similar but more critical view. Antillano said, “I believe Trump is more popular in Venezuela than in the United States,” and added, “there’s a consensus that what happened [on January 3] is for the better of the country.” He noted, “Government actors are happy because they’ve preserved their power. The right is happy because Trump, their great hero, is ruling. And the people are happy because of their expectation … that their life conditions are going to improve.” Antillano feels this is mistaken: “Not only have we not seen an improvement but in material terms, in economic terms, the situation has gotten worse and worse.”

Antillano views Venezuelans’ continuing immiseration — due to years of government mismanagement and punishing U.S. sanctions (which Trump eased on March 18, in a major policy shift allowing U.S. oil companies to deal directly with PDVSA, Venezuela’s state-owned oil company) — as the reason for their acquiescence to Venezuela’s subordination to the U.S.

“People don’t care about the idea of sovereignty or nationhood when they’re dying of hunger,” he said.

Antillano remains deeply pessimistic about Venezuela’s future. “We are in a subordinate, colonial relationship. We’re a protectorate,” he said. He also said: “[Machado] wants to return to the country to defend the idea of the political transition. Thus, we could see the great irony of María Corina becoming the anti-imperialist figure and the Bolivarian government, with its anti-imperialist origins, becoming the great defender of Trump. It’s crazy, very strange. Everything that’s happening is very sad.”

He continued: “As a friend told me, Venezuela has gone from being a laboratory for emancipatory practices to being a laboratory for the new colonialism.”

But Antillano doesn’t believe all is lost, and said he believes “an important cycle of protest is coming.” He said Corriente Comunes “is actively driving the processes of struggle as the illusion of improvement — stemming from the colonial relationship with the United States — gradually fades away.” Antillano said that Corriente Comunes had recently “held a workers’ gathering, and we believe a very significant mobilization is about to take place in all the country’s major cities, a mobilization for wages, wage increases, and labor rights, which will be the largest in many years.”

The mobilization occurred March 12, the day after we spoke, and videos show it was large and contentious. Protesters broke through a line of police blocking the National Assembly and forced legislators to listen to their salary and pension demands. While Trump and Rodríguez are seeking economic liberalization without democratization, Venezuela’s workers and leftist activists have other ideas. Venezuelans will seek to write their own story, despite being mired in conditions not of their own making. Time will tell what vision of the country will prevail, and for the foreseeable future, all actors in Venezuela will have to reckon with the imperial behemoth to the north.