“I think it’s a victory like the partisan struggle or the narrow victory in the referendum for the Republic [over] the monarchy [in 1946].” An enthused Giovanni Bachelet, a leader of the successful “No” campaign in Italy’s recent referendum on judicial reform, could be forgiven for hyping its significance. Where those past struggles laid the foundation of the modern Italian Constitution, this vote merely preserved the existing text.

Yet the comments by Bachelet, a longtime critic of right-wing tycoon Silvio Berlusconi’s assaults on the justice system, also pointed to a fundamental factor in this result. As shown in past referendums, most Italians dislike their government using short-lived electoral mandates to rewrite the Republic’s foundational text.

The result was hard to predict; polls even a couple months back had placed Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s “Yes” side in a strong lead. Her government proposed a separation of the careers of judges and prosecutors (thus stopping anyone fulfilling both roles) while also creating oversight bodies formed by sortition (random selection) rather than election.

If all this was not exactly a power grab, it did mean quashing the judiciary’s political voice, shutting up what right-wing leaders since Berlusconi have seen as a troublesome group. It also meant achieving a long-cherished goal of Meloni’s post-fascist party: having a role in (re)writing the constitution first drafted by the parties of the Resistance. The postwar ancestors of Meloni’s party long advocated sortition over party-political “factionalism.”

After a polling blackout imposed before the referendum — and much amateur, online psephology interpreting the initial turnout figures from Sunday and Monday morning’s votes — the ultimate result is a clear victory for “No,” on over 54 percent support and around a 60 percent turnout.

This was higher than the turnout in the most recent government-proposed constitutional referendum (a COVID-era vote that heavily backed cutting the number of MPs) but below the turnout opposing the 2016 reform on which liberal-centrist Premier Matteo Renzi staked (and lost) his mandate. Unlike Renzi’s referendum a decade ago, this vote will not topple the incumbent premier, i.e., Meloni. What it has done is dent her now long-established image of electoral dominance. It may even enfeeble other mooted plans to rewrite the Constitution.

Many Reasons

Justice Minister Carlo Nordio piously claimed, after the results came in, that the government had put great effort into explaining what was always a highly technical proposal. The reform itself was surely opaque to much of the electorate. A large minority of “Yes” voters told one pollster that their reasons for voting were about the merit of the reform (whereas “No” voters were more likely to stress the defense of the Constitution or criticism of the executive).

Yet the tone of the campaign suggested that, for many, it was all about giving a mandate to the government itself, or even Meloni personally. Unlike in the era when the Constitution was written, Italians are today unlikely to spend weekday evenings at local meetings of mass parties with millions of members. Still, in this referendum, among the major forces in national politics, well over 80 percent of voters sided with “Yes” or “No” in line with their preferred party’s stance.

Posturing as a European stateswoman and Trump-whisperer on the international stage, Meloni often lets lower-ranking figures take charge of domestic polemics. Yet she put her authority on the line in this campaign. She argued that the failure of her judicial plan would mean “surreal sentences, immigrants, rapists, pedophiles, drug dealers being freed, and putting your security at risk.”

Legislators from her Fratelli d’Italia party posted memes with massed ranks of Muslims bending in prayer for a “No” vote; pro-government tabloids like Libero described the Islamic presence in Italy as a “weapon” for the “No” side. Meloni’s coalition partners in the Lega likewise pose this as a chance to “stop the judges who are the illegals’ friends.” The reform was thus cast, with some exaggeration, as a way to let the government tighten the screws on immigrants by hobbling an incorrigibly “Red” judiciary.

If this stirred the right-wing base, and especially cadres of the late Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, it did not rally most Italians. This confounds some received wisdom about the government’s popularity. Since the 2022 general election, its polling position has held up well. Meloni has bolstered her authority among the right-wing half of the electorate, her Fratelli d’Italia has eaten into its allies’ support, and she also has many admirers among tiny elite-centrist parties with an outsize media footprint.

Left-wingers’ recent attempts to organize popular-initiative referendums on citizenship rights or the labor code were thwarted by low turnout. Still, claims as to Meloni’s popularity must also reckon with a deep division in the electorate. While a few neoliberal-hawk defectors from the center-left Democrats did back Meloni’s reform, the fact that most campaign propaganda cast this as a choice between the government and the judiciary — or just for or against the government — meant the result was sure to rely heavily on turnout.

There surely were many imbalances and early reports of poor turnout in the South (and its strength in right-wing-dominated Lombardy and Veneto) augured well for the “Yes” side. Even so, the ultimate count presented a different picture: turnout was up in the largest cities and among younger voters, who heavily sided against the reform.

What Next?

While many Italians did not follow party lines, the result can broadly be seen as a rare success for the so-called “broad camp.” This set of parties includes, among others, Elly Schlein’s Democrats, former premier Giuseppe Conte’s eclectic (but self-styled “progressive”) Five Star Movement, and the further-left Green-Left Alliance. In opposition since 2022, these forces have struggled to land a blow on Meloni’s coalition.

Neither regional elections nor the 2024 European contest suggested that she has lost the political initiative. While these parties speak to quite different voters (Five Star is broadly more Southern and lower income; the Democrats are older and have largely lost their blue-collar base), the referendum result will widely be perceived as a vindication of their alliance. Or rather, it will avoid the soul-searching that might have followed a “Yes” vote for Meloni.

This raises the question of whether these forces are now poised to win the 2027 general election. Their task may be a little easier if this referendum result discourages the Meloni government from other mooted electoral reforms. It has discussed either heavily rewriting the Constitution (introducing a directly elected prime minister) or rebalancing the electoral system through a simple parliamentary vote, to guarantee the single biggest coalition a majority of seats.

Such measures are widely seen as means by which Meloni’s right-wing camp could retain power after 2027 even without securing 50 percent of the vote. Still, while the government would surely have been vindicated by a victory in the justice referendum, which it didn’t get, it can hardly be assumed that electoral reform is totally off the table. There are few signs of a split between the government parties, which could imperil Meloni’s leadership.

For years, dismal cheerleaders in foreign media have hailed Meloni as the very incarnation of the Italian popular will, a pragmatic, pro-European and pro-Washington leader who also felt the deeper needs of the common people. This was arrant propaganda. Italy’s hardly impressive economic performance, the government’s dogged commitment to a low-wage growth model, plus Meloni’s inability to voice a coherent position on the current war on Iran all suggest this “pragmatism” cannot suit everyone.

Nonetheless, there are not many cracks, yet, in the twelve-million-strong base that backed Meloni in 2022. The opposition’s task remains that of mobilizing the larger share of Italians who don’t vote, especially after recent spells of austerian Democratic governance. In this referendum, many observers were impressed that even 60 percent of Italians voted. But in a country that had 80 percent–plus turnouts even a couple of decades ago, the “broad camp” still has a lot of work to do to reach out to voters, those of lower income in particular.

Meloni lost. A ghastly coterie of neoliberal-shill Democrats who supported her also lost. Racists who saw this as a way to undermine immigrants’ legal protections lost. This referendum may even have stalled other attacks on the Constitution that might have followed.

This is all good news for opponents of the current government and of the broader rise of far-right parties around Europe. But more remains to be done. If the Italian Constitution promises to remove impediments to “the effective participation of all workers in the political, economic, and social organization of the country,” this hope is further from the reality than ever. Making it a more tangible prospect, speaking to voters beyond even those who voted “No” in this referendum, is an urgent task for the broad-left camp.